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summarizes the Federal Trade Commission's recent enforcement activities in this
area.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Despite technological advances and state and federal actions,
spyware has become more elusive and problematic in 2007. A recent
survey by the National Cyber Security Alliance and America Online,
Inc. found that 80% of computers connected to the Internet have
spyware or adware installed on them.' As a result, legislation and
litigation are being pursued more aggressively to reduce the burden of
spyware on home, business, and government computers.
Spyware is software placed on computers without the consent of
the user, tracking online activity and often causing unwanted pop-up
windows to appear.2  The Anti-Spyware Coalition defines spyware
(and other potentially unwanted technologies) as:
technologies deployed without appropriate user consent
and/or implemented in ways that impair user control over:
material changes that affect their user experience, privacy, or
system security; use of their system resources, including
what programs are installed on their computers; and/or
collection, use, and distribution of their personal or other
sensitive information.3
Spyware is designed and offered by a number of providers. The
spyware programs monitor user activities and transmit user
information to remote servers and/or download unwanted targeted
advertisements.
4
1 Brian Krebs, Invasion of the Computer Snatchers, WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 2006, at W10,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/14/
AR2006021401342.htmi.
2 Jeremy Kirk, Ad Dishes Up Adware to More Than a Million PCs, PC WORLD, July 20, 2006,
http://www.pcworld.com/article/id, 126488-page, 1-c,adware/article.html.
3 Anti-Spyware Coalition, Anti-Spyware Coalition Definitions Document,
http://www.antispywarecoalition.org/documents/DefinitionsJune292006.htm (last visited Jan.
26, 2008) (The Anti-Spyware Coalition identifies several types of spyware technologies, such
as tracking software, advertising display software, remote control software, dialing software,
system modifying software, security analysis software, automatic download software, and
passive tracking technologies.).
4 Benjamin Edelman, "Spyware ": Research, Testing, Legislation, and Suits,
http://www.benedelman.org/spyware/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2008).
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Software programs defined as spyware engage in a wide range of
surreptitious activities, including keystroke recorders, screen capture
programs, and numerous additional software programs that alter
computer settings, monitor users' online activities, transmit that
information to third parties, and/or compromise computer
performance. 5 Users spend inordinate amounts of time attempting to
remove spyware, which is often designed to make uninstallation
difficult, if not impossible. Websites that distribute spyware are often
paid based on the number of computers infected with the malicious
software, motivating hackers to find new ways to install the spyware
without the consent of computer users.
6
Legislators and enforcement agencies, at both the state and federal
levels, have been working to address the problems of spyware and
unwanted adware in the past year. This note briefly highlights state
and federal legislative efforts and litigation in the states before it
focuses on a series of cases brought by the Federal Trade Commission
against purveyors of spyware and against adware companies that use
extensive affiliate networks to distribute their software.
II. STATE AND FEDERAL EFFORTS TO COMBAT SPYWARE
In 2006, anti-spyware legislation was enacted in Hawaii,
Louisiana, Rhode Island, and Tennessee. 7  The following year,
Arkansas and Virginia enacted anti-spyware legislation and, as of the
writing of this note, legislation is pending in fourteen other states.8
51d.
6 Kirk, supra note 2.
' National Conference of State Legislatures, 2006 State Legislation Relating to Internet
Spyware or Adware, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/lis/spyware06.htm (last visited Jan. 26,
2008).
8 National Conference of State Legislatures, 2007 State Legislation Relating to Internet
Spyware or Adware, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/lis/spywareO7.htm (last visited Jan. 26,
2008) (The 14 states that have introduced spyware bills are: Arkansas, California, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New York,
Pennsylvania, Texas, and Virginia. Additionally, of the states that are currently considering
spyware legislation, Illinois, Maine, Missouri, and New York are considering acts that protect
consumers from the illegal use of spyware. Regarding states that have enacted spyware
legislation in 2007, the Arkansas law relates briefly to funding to help offset state spyware
monitoring fines, while Virginia's governor signed a more comprehensive bill that classifies
key loggers, bots, and zombies as computer trespass crimes and makes it a felony for a person
to install or cause to be installed or collect information through software capable of recording
keystrokes on the computer of another.).
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Several state attorneys general filed lawsuits against purveyors of
spyware under state fraud, consumer protection laws, and, in some
cases, under new anti-spyware statutes.9 Specifically, in 2007, New
York, Texas, California, and Washington targeted and pursued
perpetrators of spyware.10
In 2007, three bills aimed at combating spyware were introduced
in the 110th Congress, yet none have been enacted as of the writing of
this note. House Resolution 964, the Securely Protect Yourself
Against Cyber Trespass Act ("Spy Act") would prohibit egregious
software activities, such as surreptitious key-stroke logging, resetting
browser settings without user consent, and hijacking modems and
browsers." It would also require software companies to provide clear
and conspicuous notice to users of how software functions and the
consequences of downloading that software, to obtain consent for
downloading and installing the software, and to provide an uninstall
process that is both easy to use and that completely removes software
from users' computers. 2 Violations would be treated as unfair and
deceptive trade practices under Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act. 3 House Resolution 964 was passed by the House,
but it is awaiting Senate action.14
House Resolution 964 was the work of the House Energy and
Commerce Committee. In March 2007, the House Judiciary
Committee introduced its own anti-spyware bill, House Resolution
1525, the Internet Spyware (I-SPY) Prevention Act of 2007.15 The bill
would enhance penalties for unauthorized access of a protected
9 CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., SPYWARE ENFORCEMENT: A REPORT BY THE CENTER FOR
DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY (CDT) (Sept. 2007),
http://www.cdt.org/privacy/spyware/20060626spyware-enforcement.php [hereinafter Spyware
Enforcement].
10 Center for Democracy & Technology, Spyware Enforcement-State,
http://www.cdt.org/privacy/spyware/20060626spyware-enforcement-state.php (last visited
Jan. 26, 2008).
11 Securely Protect Yourself Against Cyber Trespass Act, H.R. 964, 110th Cong. (2007).
121d. § 3.
13 id.
141id
15 Internet Spyware (I-SPY) Prevention Act of 2007, H.R. 1525, 110th Cong. (2007),
available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dl 10:HRO1525:@@@L&summ2=m&.
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computer 16 under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,' 7 and includes a
"sense of Congress" provision, stating that the Department of Justice
should use "[the] act, and all other available tools, to vigorously
prosecute those who use spyware to commit crimes. ... 1V House
Resolution 1525 passed the House in May 2007 and has been referred
to the Senate Judiciary Committee. The Senate has its own version of
anti-spyware legislation. In June 2007, Senator David Pryor
introduced legislation that would require notice and consent for
software downloads. The measure is pending in the Senate Committee
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. 13
III. FEDERAL TRADE CoMMIssION ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS
The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") has been the most
aggressive federal agency in the fight against spyware in the past
year.20 As of September 2007, the FTC brought eleven spyware-
16 Id. (A person who intentionally gains unauthorized access, or exceeds their authorized
access, to a protected computer by causing a program or code to be transmitted onto the
computer and intentionally uses the program in furtherance of another federal criminal offense
could face a fine and up to five years in jail. A lesser fine and prison sentence of up to two
years would be imposed if the unauthorized access is gained for either of the following:
intentionally obtaining or transmitting personal information with intent to defraud or injure a
person or cause damage to a protected computer; or intentionally impairing the security
protection of a protected computer with the intent to defraud or injure a person or damage such
computer.).
17 Matt Hines, Policy Experts Split on Spyware Laws: CDT and FTC Disagree Whether a Trio
ofAnti-Spyware Bills Before Congress Will Result in More Prosecutions, INFOWORLD, June
28, 2007, http://www.infoworld.com/article/07/06/28/Policy-experts-split-on-spyware-
laws l.html.
"s H.R. 1525 § 4.
19 Counter Spy Act, S.1625, 110th Cong. (2007). The bill would prohibit a person who is not
an authorized user of a protected computer from installing software that takes control of the
computer, modifies the computer's settings, or prevents the user's efforts to block installation
of, disable, or uninstall software. It would also prohibit such installation of software that
collects sensitive personal information without first providing clear and conspicuous
disclosure to the authorized user and obtaining the user's consent. The proposed Act would
prohibit installation of adware on a protected computer, unless the source is clear and
instructions for uninstallation are provided, or the advertisements are displayed exclusively
when the software author or publisher's website or online service is used. A number of
exceptions are found in the bill, including those for computer security, diagnostics, technical
support, detection of unauthorized use of fraudulent software, and other illegal activities.
20 The Department of Justice has filed complaints against perpetrators of spyware under the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and the Wiretap Act, with 11 cases to date; none were filed in
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related cases under Section 5 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a), which
prohibits unfair and deceptive commercial practices. 2 1 The following
is a discussion of the most recent of these cases, some against
purveyors of spyware, others against distributors of adware.
The FTC obtained stipulated permanent injunctions, effectively
shutting down the business operations of several spyware providers in
2007. In its case against Odysseus Marketing, Inc. and its principal,
Walter Rines, the FTC alleged that the defendants' online
advertisements for software that would allow anonymous peer-to-peer
file sharing, using claims like "DOWNLOAD MUSIC WITHOUT
FEAR" and "DON'T LET THE RECORD COMPANIES WIN," were
false and misleading because the software did not, in fact, make peer-
to-peer file sharing anonymous.
22
Additionally, the FTC alleged that the software was bundled with
"Clientman," a hidden spyware program that surreptitiously
downloaded dozens of other software programs, including some that
reformatted search engine results in favor of defendants' clients.23 The
complaint further alleged that Clientman collected consumers'
personal information and installed third-party software that delivered
pop-ups and other advertisements to consumers without first notifying
them. 4 Moreover, the Clientman software exploited browser security
vulnerabilities in order to download material to the consumer
computers.
25
The FTC alleged that Odysseus Marketing violated Section 5(a) of
the FTC Act by unfairly and deceptively infecting computers of
2007, however. Spyware Enforcement, supra note 9. The Center for Democracy and
Technology maintains a list of cases the Department of Justice has brought from 2005 to the
present. The Department of Justice also maintains a database of recently prosecuted computer
crimes dating from 1998. Department of Justice, Computer Crime Cases,
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/cccases.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2008).
21 Spyware Enforcement, supra note 9 (The FTC also maintains a spyware page that has
educational materials for consumers and a list of FTC enforcement actions at
http://www.ftc.gov/spyware).
22 First Amended Complaint for Injunction and Other Equitable Relief 35, FTC v. Odysseus
Marketing, Inc., Civil No. 05-CV-330-SM (D.N.H. Mar. 24, 2006), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0423205/060504amendedcmplt.pdf.
231 Id. 8, 13.
24 id.
25 Id. 9-10.
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unknowing consumers with multiple spyware programs. 26  The
Commission's willingness to use its "unfairness" authority in this case
is noteworthy. Specifically, the Commission alleged that the
download and installation of Clientman software onto consumers'
computers without their knowledge or consent, and the subsequent
collection of their personal information, was unfair.27 As a result of
the downloads, consumers were forced to spend substantial time and
money attempting to prohibit further collection of personal
information, and to rectify damage done to their computers'
performance caused by the software. These problems, though, could
not be rectified, and the Clientman software could neither be located
nor uninstalled through reasonable means. Therefore, consumers
could not reasonably avoid the harm caused by the software, and the
defendants' actions were thus "unfair" within the meaning of the FTC
Act.28 The FTC's deceptiveness claims stemmed from the defendants'
alleged failure to disclose the bundling of Clientman with their
purported file-sharing software and their false representations to
consumers that the software would provide anonymity for file
sharing.
29
In October 2006, the FTC and defendants entered into a stipulated
order and settlement, which prohibited the defendants from (1)
downloading software onto consumers' computers without notice and
consent, (2) exploiting security vulnerabilities to download and install
software, (3) misrepresenting what their software does and how it
works, and (4) collecting personal information without notice and
consent.30  The order required defendants to disclose any future
software downloads to consumers and to provide an effective uninstall
mechanism.31 Finally, Odysseus was required to pay $1.75 million in
26 Id. 34, 37, 40, 43.
27 Id. 31-34.
21 Id. 41-43.
29 d. 38-40.
30 Stipulated Final Order for Permanent Injunction and Settlement of Claims for Monetary
Relief at 8-12, FTC v. Odysseus Marketing, Inc. (D.N.H. Oct. 24, 2006), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0423205/061121 odysseusstipfinal.pdf
3" Id. at 8-17. The FTC alleged that, rather than remove the software, the defendants'
uninstall mechanism actually downloaded more software programs.
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equitable relief; all but $10,000 of which was suspended because the
defendants were unable to pay.
32
The Commission's case against ERG Ventures, LLC, a spyware
provider, its principals, and an affiliate distributor, follows the pattern
set by FTC v. Odysseus Marketing, Inc.33 The Commission alleged
that the defendants misled consumers into downloading a package of
malicious software programs on consumers' computers by hiding it in
seemingly harmless and free software, such as screensaver programs
and video files. 34 The Media Motor Application package downloaded
malware that, among other things, changed consumers' default
homepages, tracked consumers' online activities, added difficult-to-
remove toolbars displaying pop-up ads that included pornography,
altered browser settings, and degraded the performance of consumers'
computers. 35  Additionally, the complaint alleged that many of the
downloaded malware programs were difficult or impossible to remove,
and still others disabled anti-spyware software on users' computer
further contributing to the harms sustained by consumers.36
As in Odysseus Marketing, the FTC in FTC v. ERG Ventures
alleged claims of both deception and unfairness under Section 5 of the
FTC Act.37 The deceptiveness claims stemmed from the defendants'
failure to alert consumers that the free software was bundled with the
Media Motor Application, and defendants' false representation in an
End User License Agreement ("EULA"). The EULA alleged that
consumers could prevent the installation of malware on their
computers by clicking a "cancel" button. The unfairness claims were
based on the substantial harm to consumers caused by the Media
Motor Application software. 38 Because the software was downloaded
32 1d. at 16.
33 Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief, FTC v. ERG Ventures, LLC, No. 3:06-
CV-00578-LRH-VPC (D. Nev. Oct. 30, 2006), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0623192/061030ergventurescmplt.pdf.
14 Id.$ 15. The FTC initially sought and was granted a temporary restraining order ("TRO").
The FTC also sought the TRO to temporarily freeze ERG's assets, requiring the defendants to
prepare an accounting of their assets and ordering the defendants to preserve their business
records and provide other equitable relief that is in the public interest. Id.
35 1d. 17.
36 Id. I 38-40.
37 Id. 99 52, 55, 58, 61, 65.
381 Id 9956-58.
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surreptitiously and could not be removed even if discovered, the
ensuing harms could not have been reasonably avoided by
consumers.
39
In October 2007, the FTC and ERG Ventures entered into a
stipulated final order that prohibited the defendants from downloading
software onto consumer computers without consent or downloading
software that interferes with computer use.40 The order also required
the defendants to fully disclose the name and function of all software
they install on consumers' computers, to offer consumers the ability to
cancel installation after reviewing the disclosure, and to provide an
effective and transparent uninstall mechanism.4' Finally, the
defendants were required to pay $330,000 to the Commission as
consumer redress.
42
The Commission's cases against Enternet Media, Inc.43 and Digital
Enterprises, Inc.44 echo the issues raised in the earlier spyware cases.
In FTC v. Enternet Media Inc., the defendants bundled free software
downloads with software that served pop-up ads containing purported
free browser and security upgrades. The complaint alleged that the
free upgrade software surreptitiously tracked users' online activities,
changed their default home pages, inserted new toolbars and other
software that could not be uninstalled, generated pop-up ads, and
degraded computer functionality. 45  The Enternet Media defendants
39 Id. 43-48.
40 Stipulated Final Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary Judgment as to Defendants
ERG Ventures, LLC, Elliott S. Cameron, Robert A. Davidson, II, and Garry E. Hill, FTC v.
ERG Ventures, LLC, No. 3:06-CV-00578-HDM-VPC, (D. Nev. Oct. 3, 2007), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0623192/070928ergventursestipfinal.pdf.
41 id.
42 Id. at 7.
43 First Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief, FTC v. Enternet
Media, Inc., No. CV05-7777 CAS AJWx (C.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2005), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0523135/0511l0amndcomp0523135.pdf [hereinafter Enternet
Media Complaint].
44 Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief, FTC v. Digital Enterprises,
Inc., No. CV06-4923 CAS AJWx (C.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2006), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0623008/060808movielandcmplt.pdf [hereinafter Digital
Enterprises Complaint].
45 Enternet Media Complaint, supra note 43, 12.
ENGLE
US: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
included both the providers of the software and a webmaster affiliate
through which the surreptitious software was distributed.46
The defendants in FTC v. Digital Enterprises, Inc. were the owners
of three websites through which software serving particularly intrusive
pop-up advertisements was downloaded without notice or consent.47
The complaint alleged that the Digital Enterprises software bombarded
consumers with large, noisy pop-ups, often lasting close to a minute
which could not be manually closed or exited by the consumer. 4
According to the Commission, the pop-ups falsely claimed that
consumers had signed up for a three-day trial period for Digital
Enterprises' software download service and failed to cancel before the
deadline, thereby incurring a $99 fee. Consumers who tried to remove
the software from the Windows control panel "add/remove programs"
screen were redirected to a website that demanded the $99 fee to stop
the pop-ups. 49 In many cases, consumers were only able to stop the
pop-ups by paying the fee demanded.50
Enternet Media and Digital Enterprises involved claims of both
unfairness and deception. Misrepresentations as to the true nature of
the downloaded software gave rise to the Commission's deception
claims. In each case, the Commission reiterated that surreptitious
installation of software that harms computers and cannot be removed
by reasonable means is an unfair trade practice. 51  In Digital
Enterprises, the defendant's demand that consumers pay to stop the
pop-ups was also alleged to be an unfair practice. Each case ended in
2007 with a stipulated permanent injunction and an order prohibiting
the defendants from, among other things, downloading software
without notice and consumer consent, and without providing an
effective uninstall mechanism.5 2 The orders also included significant
46 Id. 5-10.
47 Digital Enterprises Complaint, supra note 44, 6-18.
4Id. 51.
49 Id. fig. 4.
50 Id. 37.
51 Enternet Media Complaint, supra note 43, 44-46; Digital Enterprises Complaint, supra
note 44, 54-56.
52 Stipulated Final Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary Judgment as to Defendants
Enternet Media, Inc., Conspy & Co., Inc., Lida Rohbani, Nima Hakimi, and Baback (Babak)
Hakimi, FTC v. Entemet Media, Inc., No. CV05-7777 CAS AJW, (C.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2006),
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monetary judgments against the defendants. Enternet Media and its
principals were required to pay $8,500,000, all but $2,045,000 of
which was suspended; 53 Digital Enterprises was required to pay
$500,000 in consumer redress.
4
In addition to obtaining an injunction in the case discussed above,
the Federal Trade Commission entered into two significant settlements
in 2007 with providers and distributors of advertising software
("adware") that used extensive affiliate networks to distribute their
software by surreptitiously bundling it with various types of free
software. These settlements are significant not only because they
reiterate the Commission's position on "unfairness" and "deception"
within the meaning of the FTC Act, but also because they hold the
adware companies responsible for the actions of the affiliates in their
distribution networks.
In its case against Zango, Inc., the Commission alleged that Zango
used a network of affiliates (who recruited sub-affiliates) to distribute
its adware by bundling it with "lureware" (including free browser
upgrades, utilities, screen savers, games, peer-to-peer file sharing,
and/or entertainment content) installed on consumers' computers."
The bundling took place either with inadequate notice (e.g., through
inconspicuous hyperlinks) or without any notice to consumers. Once
installed, the adware tracked consumers' Internet activity and
bombarded them with targeted pop-up ads.56  Moreover, the
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0523135/060823entemetmediastlmnt.pdf
[hereinafter Enternet Media Final Order]; Settlement Agreement and Stipulated Final Order
for Permanent Injunction and Monetary Relief, FTC v. Digital Enterprises, Inc., No. CV06-
4923 CAS AJWx (C.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/
0623008/070905digitalenterprisesstipfnl.pdf [hereinafter Digital Enterprises Final Order].
53 Enternet Media Final Order, supra note 52, at 8-9. The Commission entered into a
separate stipulated order and permanent injunction against Nicholas Albert, Enternet Media's
affiliate. Stipulated Final Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary Judgment as to
Defendant Nicholas C. Albert, FTC v. Entemet Media, Inc., No. CVOS-7777 CAS AJWx
(C.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2006), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0523135/061214enternetmediaalbertstlmnt.pdf [hereinafter
Enternet Media Stipulated Order with Albert]. The order prohibits Albert from interfering
with consumers' use of their computers and from misrepresenting the nature of software
downloaded from his Website, and requires him to pay $3,300 as disgorgement. Id. at 7-9.
54 Digital Enterprises Final Order, supra note 52, at 13-14.
55 Complaint 10, In re Zango, Inc., Docket No. C-4186, (FTC Nov. 3, 2006), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0523130/0523130cmp061103.pdf [hereinafter Zango
Complaint].
56 1d. 6.
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Commission alleged that the adware could not be reasonably
identified, located, or removed by consumers, because Zango designed
it to be extremely difficult to locate or uninstall. For example, Zango
failed to name the source of the adware in the pop-up ads, obfuscated
the name of the software in the Windows "add/remove programs"
function, and provided an "uninstall mechanism" that did not remove
the software.
The Commission's claims in Zango were substantially similar to
those in its subsequent case against Direct Revenue, LLC, which
marketed and distributed its adware on its own websites and through
an extensive network of affiliates and sub-affiliates.5 9 According to
the Commission, Direct Revenue's adware was bundled with
"lureware," such as free games and screensavers, and installed (either
by Direct Revenue or by its affiliates) on consumers' computers with
little or no notice, or consent.6( The Commission also alleged that
Direct Revenue designed the adware to be difficult, if not impossible,
to identify, locate, and uninstall.6'
The Zango and Direct Revenue matters included deceptiveness and
unfairness claims. The Commission alleged that offering "lureware"
without disclosing that it is bundled with adware was a deceptive trade
practice, because the fact that the adware tracked online activities and
served pop-up ads would be material to consumers' decisions whether
to install the free software and content in the first place. 62  In each
case, the Commission also alleged that the installation of adware,
without notice or consent, that could not reasonably be identified as
adware, was an unfair trade practice, whether it was located on the
computer or had been uninstalled by consumers. The Commission
alleged that the failure to provide a reasonable means to identi j
locate, or uninstall the adware is an unfair trade practice in itself.
17 Id. 14.
5 Id.
59 Complaint 10, In re Direct Revenue, LLC, Docket No. C-4194, (FTC June 29, 2007)
available at http:I/www.ftc.gov/ostcaselist/0523131/052313 Icmp070629.pdf [hereinafter
Direct Revenue Complaint].
60 Id. 12.
6 1 Id. 15.
62 Zango Complaint, supra note 55,1 16; Direct Revenue Complaint, supra note 58,1 16.
6 Zango Complaint, supra note 55,1 18; Direct Revenue Complaint, supra note 58, 18.
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Finally, the Commission alleged that these practices have or were
likely to cause substantial consumer injury (in time or money spent in
locating and removing unwanted adware) that consumers could not
have reasonably avoided and that is not outweighed by benefits to
consumers or competition.
64
The Zango and Direct Revenue settlements were substantially
similar.65 Each required significant payments to the Federal Trade
Commission ($3,000,000 and $1,500,000, respectively).66  The
settlements require each company to obtain "express consent" for
future download and installation of its adware. "Express consent"
included both clear and conspicuous notice outside the End User
License Agreement of the "material terms" of the software (including
how it functions) and an affirmative step by the consumer, such as
clicking on a clearly labeled "install" or "download" hyperlink to
indicate consent.67 Advertisements must be labeled with the name of
the software program serving them and must also include a clearly
labeled, direct hyperlink to instructions on how to submit complaints
and uninstall the adware.68 The settlements also required Zango and
Direct Revenue to provide a clear notice and a functioning e-mail or
Intemet-based mechanism for consumer complaints (and to promptly
investigate those complaints) and an effective uninstall mechanism
that can be easily located (e.g., in the operating system's add/remove
prgrams list).69
Perhaps most significant, however, are the settlement provisions
holding Zango and Direct Revenue accountable for the practices of
64 Zango Complaint, supra note 55, 17; Direct Revenue Complaint, supra note 58, 17.
65 Decision and Order, In the Matter of Zango, Inc., Docket No. C-4168 (FTC Mar. 7, 2007),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0523130/0523130c4186decisionorder.pdf
[hereinafter Zango Decision and Order]; Decision and Order, In the Matter of DirectRevenue,
LLC, Docket No. C-4194 (FTC June 26, 2007), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0523131/0523131 do070629.pdf [hereinafter Direct Revenue
Decision and Order].
66 Zango Decision and Order, supra note 65, at 8; Direct Revenue Decision and Order, supra
note 65, at 8.
67 Zango Decision and Order, supra note 65, at 3; Direct Revenue Decision and Order, supra
note 65, at 3-4.
68 Zango Decision and Order, supra note 65, at 7; Direct Revenue Decision and Order, supra
note 65, at 7-8.
69 Zango Decision and Order, supra note 65, at 4-5, 7; Direct Revenue Decision and Order,
supra note 65, at 6, 8.
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their affiliates and distribution networks. Each company must have a
"comprehensive program reasonably designed to ensure" that affiliates
obtain consumers' "express consent" prior to installing their adware on
consumers' computers. 70 To do so, each company must obtain contact
and bank account information for each of its affiliates, and require
them to sign an agreement to comply with the settlement terms.
Affiliates must be on notice that their failure to comply will result in
termination from the affiliate network. 71 Each company's affiliates
must, in turn, impose the same requirements upon their sub-affiliates
and sub-contractors.7 2
IV. CONCLUSION
As the discussion at the 2007 Federal Trade Commission "Spam
Summit" demonstrates, 73 the flood of spyware, and other malicious
software delivered by e-mail, is not likely to abate any time soon. The
states have enacted a patchwork of legal tools to combat spyware, but
the federal government has yet to enact a national enforcement
standard. The Federal Trade Commission has stepped in, using its
existing authority under the FTC Act to sue spyware providers and
distributors for unfair and deceptive trade practices, in many cases
shutting down spyware operations entirely. In the absence of federal
legislation specifically targeted at spyware, the Commission's
enforcement efforts are essential in the battle against those who have
taken advantage of the Internet's open architecture to invade
consumers' computers with unwanted or destructive software.
70 Zango Decision and Order, supra note 65, at 5-6; Direct Revenue Decision and Order,
supra note 65, at 6-7.
71 Zango Decision and Order, supra note 65, at 5; Direct Revenue Decision and Order, supra
note 65, at 7.
72 Zango Decision and Order, supra note 65, at 5-6; Direct Revenue Decision and Order,
supra note 65, at 7.
73 FTC, Spain Summit, http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/spamsummit/index.shtml (last
visited Jan. 26, 2008).
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